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Abstract. Query auctions are (iterative) auctions in which bidders have
to select (in each round) from a finite set of actions. We show that, when
bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex
post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient
when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realiza-
tions of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we
allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there
is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains
this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the
running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of
valuations.
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1 Introduction
This paper concerns the sales of a single indivisible item to n buyers by means of
an auction, each buyer having a private valuation vi for the item. 3 This setting
has been thoroughly analyzed and is very well understood (see for example
Krishna (2002)). The sealed-bid second price auction by Vickrey (1961), and the
ascending clock version of the English auction are two strategically equivalent
designs that solve the allocation problem in dominant strategies. In the dominant
strategy equilibrium both auctions allocate the item efficiently –they both award
the item to the bidder with the highest valuation. The Vickrey auction collects
sealed bids, allocates to the bidder with the highest bid (if more than one, using
a lottery), and sets the price equal to the second-highest bid. The ascending
clock version of the English auction continuously increases the price on a price
clock, and bidders step out if the price becomes larger than their willingness to
pay. The clock stops when the second last bidder stepped out. If at some point
3 We assume quasi-linear utilities throughout the paper.
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all remaining bidders step out simultaneously, the item is assigned by a lottery
among them at the current price.
When bidder’s valuations are continuous, that is, may take any real number in
some interval [α, β], practical implementations of both auctions face a problem.
The strategic properties of the Vickrey auction rely on exact communication of
valuations between bidders and auctioneer. However, whatever communication
language we use, the number of expressible elements in [α, β] will be countable,
while [α, β] is uncountable. Therefore no such language is sufficient to communi-
cate the necessary information in the Vickrey auction. The clock version of the
English auction requires that bidders step out at exactly their valuation, which
disallows any discrete clock increments. The question arises whether there is at
all any practically implementable auction in case of continuous valuations that
shares the properties of the Vickrey auction, and, if not, to which extend its
properties have to be given up in a practical implementation. Informally, a prac-
tical implementations should not rely on bids with infinitely long encoding or
a continuous clock. We shed light on these questions by providing negative as
well as positive results. As part of our analysis we offer a definition of practically
implementable auctions and call such auctions query auctions. Query auctions
are (iterative) auctions in which bidders have to select (in each round) from a
finite set of actions.
We show that for every query auction in equilibrium necessarily the item
will be assigned inefficiently with positive probability, unless one accepts the
unrealistic phenomenon that the auction will last indefinitely –i.e. the auction
runs an infinite number of rounds– for almost all realizations of valuations. In
other words, any implementation of the Vickrey auction by means of a query
auction in a model with continuous valuations will necessarily have an infinite
running time for almost all realizations of valuations, and is hence not a feasible
option in any practical sense. On the other hand, we show that the probability
of assigning the item inefficiently can be made arbitrary small. More precisely,
we define a family of query auctions, parameterized by values c ∈ (0, 1] and
called bisection auctions, for which in equilibrium the probability of inefficient
allocation is at most c.
At first glance, one might argue that these results are of theoretical interest
only as the assumption of continuous valuations might by itself not hold in
practice. In other words, a theory of implementable auctions should anyhow
assume discrete sets of valuations. However, our results for continuous valuations
are also of interest in discrete settings. Firstly, assume that the numeric precision
of discrete valuations varies among bidders, and is furthermore not known by
the auctioneer. This is imaginable in auctions used in distributed, computerized
systems, for example for network resource allocation. In such cases our positive
results offer the possibility to make the pessimistic assumption that valuations
are continuous and then use a bisection auction that performs well even for
this setting. Thereby we will need no a-priori agreement on discrete bid levels.
Another setting of interest are integer valuations that are very large, say in
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the range of billions of Euro, as in spectrum auctions. In such settings, bid
increments will have to be very large if they should lead to a reasonable number of
rounds of the English auction (or its combinatorial counterpart of a simultaneous
ascending auction (SAA) Milgrom (2000)) , giving the set of valuations a flavor of
continuity. As a bisection auction performs well even for continuous valuations,
they could provide a reasonable alternative to designs with a priori fixed bid
increments.
We will now turn to a more detailed description of the exact environment in
which and the exact conditions under which our results hold.
Continuous valuations. Throughout the paper we assume that valuations
can take any real number in an interval [α, β) ⊂ R. 4 When analyzing the pro-
posed bisection auctions, we assume further that the types are identically, inde-
pendently distributed, with a continuous cumulative density. These assumptions
on type distributions are however only of importance for analyzing the proba-
bility of inefficient allocation. All game theoretic properties of bisection auctions
are independent of any assumption on type distributions. In particular, they
hold also for correlated type distributions.
Query auctions. In a query auction the auctioneer sequentially offers bid-
ders the opportunity to take one of a finite set of actions. Such an offer is referred
to as a query. 5 During the course of the auction each bidder may be, and usu-
ally will be, queried more than once. Typically an “action” takes the form of an
answer to a query regarding the valuation of the bidder in question, such as “Is
your valuation larger than 15?” to which the response can be either a yes or a
no.
Determination of winner and payment in a query auction are based exclu-
sively on the actions taken by the bidders in response to the queries of the
auctioneer. The auction ends as soon as both winner and payment are deter-
mined. The number of times a particular bidder is queried during the auction is
not assumed to be bounded, and the auction may thus potentially take an infi-
nite number of query rounds. We will only consider ex post individually rational
query auctions, meaning that each bidder, given his valuation vi, has a plan of
4 Our negative results on query auctions would not change if we weaken this assump-
tion. All what we need is that the elements in [α, β] that can occur have a positive
Lebesgue measure.
5 Each separate query by the auctioneer could be thought of as a round in the auction
because the action taken by the queried bidder is, at least in our setting, supposed
to be publicly observable. Only actions whose effects can only be observed at the
same moment in time by other bidders are usually considered to be taken in the
same round. Rounds typically differ from each other in terms of the information
available to bidders. In that sense each query could be counted as a round. In this
paper though we deviate slightly from this standard interpretation. The order in
which bidders are queried is usually fixed, and a round is a sequence of queries in
which each bidder is queried exactly once.
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action in the auction that guarantees him a non-negative payoff, regardless of
the behavior of the other bidders.
Inefficiency of ex post equilibrium. In this paper we investigate the
efficiency of ex post equilibria in query auctions. An ex post equilibrium is a
strategy profile such that, given any realization of valuations, the plan of action
prescribed to a bidder in the auction by his strategy is a best response to the
plans of action prescribed by the strategies of the other bidders given their
valuations. The first main result in this paper can now be precisely formulated as
follows. An ex post equilibrium is called sometimes finite if the set of realizations
of valuations for which in equilibrium the auction ends in finite time has positive
Lebesgue measure. The result is that, given any ex post individually rational
query auction, any ex post equilibrium in that auction that is sometimes finite
cannot be ex post efficient.
Existence of ex post equilibrium in bisection auctions. The first result
poses the question how much we need to give up in efficiency in order to be able
to find query auctions that are individually rational and sometimes finite. In
order to answer this question we show first that for a very wide class of query
auctions, namely the so-called bisection auctions, an individually rational ex post
equilibrium exists. Moreover, under a mild assumption (namely that the price
in the auction can in principle be driven up to exceed any possible valuation of
any bidder, an assumption that is met by all existing auctions) the equilibrium
can even be shown to be finite for any realization of valuations.
The bisection mechanism works as follows. Valuations of bidders are assumed
to be drawn from an interval I = [α, β). Before the auction starts, an order of
the bidders in the auction is chosen randomly. We assume that this ordering is
1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ · · · ≺ n− 1 ≺ n.
The auction runs for an a priori indefinite number of rounds. In each round
there is a specific payment P to be made by a bidder if he wins in this round.
In every round there is also a query price Q which is higher than the current
payment, and an upper bound H on future payments that is higher than the
query price. Initially the payment and the upper bound are set as P = α and
H = β, and all bidders are active. In every round the auctioneer asks the bidders
that are active in that round whether they would be willing to pay the query
price. Bidders are queried openly in increasing order.
If only one bidder is willing to pay the query price, he becomes the winner of
the auction. He has to pay the current payment (not the query price). If more
than 1 bidder is willing to pay the query price, the auction proceeds into the
next round. Only those bidders who agreed to pay the query price stay active.
The query price becomes the payment, and the new query price is raised to a
level strictly above the old query price, but still below the upper bound. If no
bidder is willing to pay the query price all bidders stay active, the payment stays
the same, the old query price becomes the new upper bound, and the new query
price is set between the payment and the new upper bound. In case no winner is
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found, i.e., should the auction run indefinitely, then among the bidders who are
still active the one with highest ranking wins and he pays the lowest price that
is still higher than or equal to any of the payments that were announced while
the auction was running.
Effectively a bisection auction is a variation of the bisection auction presented
in Grigorieva et al. (2007), the main two differences being that in the present
paper the auction may last indefinitely, and that the auction stops as soon as the
winner is found. The bisection auction in Grigorieva et al. (2007) was designed
to handle the situation in which bidders have discrete valuations. The present
definition of a bisection auction is specifically designed to handle continuous
valuations.
Given a bisection auction we construct a specific ex-post equilibrium, called
the bluff equilibrium, for that auction. The bluff equilibrium requires each bidder
to act as follows. When there still is an active bidder with a lower rank in
the ordering, the bidder stays in the auction until the query price exceeds his
valuation. As soon as he becomes the active bidder with the lowest rank, he
stays in the auction until the payment exceeds his valuation (effectively a bluff
since he will say yes to a query price exceeding his valuation). We show that
this strategy is ex post individually rational, and that the resulting profile where
each bidder uses this strategy is an ex post equilibrium. We also show that the
bluff equilibrium is sometimes finite –and hence not ex post efficient according
to our first result. Furthermore, we show that the query price is increasing in
the bluff equilibrium.
In the second half of the paper we analyze exactly how (in)efficient the bluff
equilibrium may be. In particular we show that approximate efficiency can be
achieved within the family of c-fraction auctions, a special class of bisection
auctions.
c-fraction auctions. In a c-fraction auction, given the payment P and upper
bound H in any round, the query price in that round is given by Q = (1− c)P +
cH, where c is a rational number in the interval (0, 1). Thus, the increment with
which the payment P is increased is a fixed fraction c of the current price interval
[P,H) (the interval that contains all future payments, no matter what responses
the bidders give to future queries).
As a measure of inefficiency we employ the probability of inefficient allocation.
We assume that valuations of bidders are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution on the interval [α, β). 6 The probability of inefficient allocation is
the probability –according to the joint probability distribution on [α, β)n– of the
set of realizations of valuations for which in equilibrium the item does not get
assigned to a bidder with the highest valuation.
6 We use the uniform distribution merely for ease of exposition. Our results in the
second part of the paper hold as soon as valuations are i.i.d. draws from an arbitrary
probability distribution on [α, β) with a continuous cumulative density.
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The main finding in this part of the paper is that for the c-fraction auction the
probability of inefficient allocation is smaller than or equal to c, no matter how
many bidders participate in the auction. Moreover, the running time of any c-
fraction auction in the bluff equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations7.
Thus, the minimum level of efficiency can be determined by the auctioneer before
it is known how many bidders will participate in the auction by choosing the
appropriate fraction c, and finite running time is guaranteed. However, we also
show that the probability of inefficient allocation is bounded away from zero. In
other words, given the fraction c, the probability of inefficient allocation does not
converge to zero as the number of participants becomes large. This implies that
c is the only tool available to the auctioneer to control the level of inefficiency,
increasing the number of participants is not an appropriate method.
As a comment on the full generality of these statements, we stress again that
the same conclusions can be obtained for any continuous probability distribution
on [α, β) from which valuations are independently drawn. In this general setting
we construct a variant of the c-fraction auction for which all the above claims
hold as well.
These results alleviate the severity of our initial inefficiency result. The in-
efficiency result said that in our setting efficiency can only be achieved at the
expense of an infinite running time of the auction for almost all realizations
of valuations. The second part of the paper on the other hand shows that, by
choosing the appropriate auction, we can have approximate efficiency (meaning
that the probability of inefficient allocation can be made arbitrarily small) in
equilibrium, while the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for
all realizations of valuations. Moreover, given the desired level of efficiency, the
particular choice of auction can be made independently of the number of bidders
that will participate in the auction.
Related literature. It is common sense in auction design that ascending
auctions should utilize minimum bid increments. In case of continuous valua-
tions, one typically requires that new bids are at least some ² higher than stand-
ing high bids. Demange et al. (1986) proposed this approach for multi-item
auctions with bidders who demand at most one item. Ausubel and Milgrom
(2002) use it in ascending combinatorial auctions. The advantage of our bisec-
tion auction in comparison to designs with minimum increments is an expected
number of rounds that is only logarithmic in the number of bidders, indepen-
dent of the length of the interval [α, β) from which the valuations are drawn
(Grigorieva et al. (2006)).
Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) study a model with continuous valuations
where bidders are obedient and can only bid on a finite number of bid levels.
They analyze how the choice of bid levels influences efficiency and revenue under
the assumption of straightforward bidding by the bidders. They derive bounds
on the loss of welfare and show that, when valuations are uniformly distributed,
7 In Grigorieva et al. (2006) it is shown that the expected running time is O(logn).
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for 2 bidders and m bid levels the evenly spaced bid level auction is revenue op-
timal as well as welfare optimal, with an expected loss of welfare of at most 16m2 .
In the same model David et al. (2005) argue that a slightly modified version of
the auction with discrete bid levels has truthful bidding as a dominant strategy
equilibrium. They show that in equilibrium for more than 2 bidders the optimal
auction has decreasing bid increments, and subsequently analyze the probabil-
ity of inefficient allocation, both in the case of evenly spaced bid levels and if
bid levels are chosen optimally. In both papers the optimal choice of bid levels
depends on the number of bidders, while we derive bounds on the probability
of inefficient allocation and the expected loss of welfare that are independent of
the number of bidders.
Also Blumrosen and Nisan (2002), Blumrosen et al. (2003), Blumrosen et al.
(2007) and Blumrosen and Feldman (2006) study a model where bidders have
continuous valuations and a finite set of bid levels. They show that in their
model truthful bidding is a dominant strategy equilibrium and derive bounds
on the loss of welfare in equilibrium. The loss of welfare for equally spaced k
bid levels is O( 1k2 ), where k ≥ n has to hold. Blumrosen and Feldman (2006)
show that the lower bound n for k can be omitted if different bid levels are used
for different bidders. But then the O( 1k2 ) is a bound for fixed n, as n is part
of the constant. Again our approach allows to design of auctions that achieve
approximate efficiency close to 0 independent of the number of bidders.
Parkes (2005) studies a model in which bidders are uncertain about their
preferences and preference elicitation is costly. He shows that in such an envi-
ronment ascending price query auctions can achieve better allocative efficiency
than a sealed bid auction, using less elicitation of preferences.
Notably, our bisection auctions are ascending price auctions, as the payment
is increasing or stays the same in any round. However, query prices might be
decreasing, and there can be a difference between a query price to which a
bidder has committed himself and the price he has to pay. Similar features can
be found in the single-item auctions by David et al. (2005) and combinatorial
auctions by Mishra and Parkes (2007). Grigorieva and Strobel (2006) show in an
experimental evaluation for the case of integer valuations this is of no negative
influence on equilibrium bidding.
Organization of the full paper. Section 2 is a preliminary section where
we collected most of the known results on auction design that we use in this
paper. In section 3 we show that, when valuations are continuous, efficiency of
ex post equilibria in query auctions can only be obtained at the expense of an
infinite running time of the auction for almost all realizations of valuations. In
section 4 we provide a family of query auctions, the bisection auctions, in which
we prove the existence of an ex post individually rational ex post equilibrium,
called the bluff equilibrium, that has a finite running time for a non-negligible
set of valuations. Hence bluff equilibria are ex post inefficient. In section 5 we
show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small –but
positive– probability, there is a bisection auction that attains this level of inef-
ficiency in equilibrium, while the running time is finite for every realization of
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valuations. Section 6 concludes. Appendix 1 is devoted to an elementary proof of
the Theorem of Green and Laffont in our (simple) context. Appendix 2 contains
proofs of statements that are used in section 4.
The full paper is available as METEOR research memorandum8. In a com-
panion paper (Grigorieva et al. (2006)), we offer a more detailed study of the
performance of c-bisection auctions.
The first author acknowledges support by the Dutch Science Foundation
NWO through grant 401-01-101. The second author acknowledges support by
the Dutch Science Foundation NWO through a VICI-grant.
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